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Abstract
Economic behavior often takes place in groups of small numbers of people
interacting with each other (like work teams, neighborhoods, social networks,
etc.). Characteristic of such interaction is the development of (affective)
interpersonal relationships, or social ties. According to sociologists, the
embeddedness of economic behavior in networks of social ties has a profound
impact on economic performance. Although, in economics, there is a growing
awareness of the significance of social factors, the study of social dynamics is
still in its infancy. In this paper we investigate experimentally the development of
social ties structures, and thereby the formation of informal groups, through
economic interaction in a public good environment. It turns out that complicated
dynamics arise from individual differences in social value orientation and
(affective) response patterns. Our findings point at the importance of leadership
in controlling and channeling emotions and sentiments to build effective groups,
like teams or communities. This leads to a different perspective on
management than the one provided by standard agency theory.
JEL Classification: C91, H41, A13
Joep Sonnemans
University of Amsterdam

















Economic behavior, in the private as well as the public sector, often takes place in groups of small
numbers of people interacting with each other. Think of work teams, committees, boards of directors,
governmental bureaus, households, or neighborhoods. At closer inspection, this even happens in
situations modeled by standard economic theory as involving the anonymous interaction of many
agents. Examples are competitive commodity markets and corporate shareholding. In many
commodity markets small networks of entrepreneurs, subcontractors and customers exist (Granovetter
1985, Uzzi 1996). And, in case of public companies, shares are often heavily concentrated in the hands
of a small number of major shareholders (La Porta et al. 1998).
1 In all these settings people often have
little or no choice with whom to interact, since the cost of leaving the group may be very high. This
directs attention to an issue which is largely ignored in economics, which is social dynamics. While in
the theoretical many-agents abstraction the dynamics of social relationships may be safely neglected,
this is not so in the real world of small number interaction. In that case, social factors like loyalty,
social approval or status, which have recently attracted some attention in the economics literature (see
Akerlof 1983, Holländer 1990, Bernheim 1994), become relevant. However, this also holds for such
easily recognized, though hardly studied, affective influences like personal chemistry, emotions,
antagonisms or affinities. The following statement by Boonstra, CEO of Philips, illustrates: “A
company is a concentration of human emotions (...) Sometimes you want to achieve something, and
you observe that it will not happen. Then, waves of emotions pay a role, and bridges cannot be built.
Most conflicts in organizations occur because emotions are not controlled”.
2 Contemporary
sociologists have forcefully argued that the embeddedness of economic behavior in networks of
affective interpersonal relationships (social ties) has a profound impact on the economic performance
of markets and organizations (see, e.g., Coleman 1984, Turner 1999). In economics, the importance of
social ties for economic behavior was already noticed by Adam Smith (1984 [1759], part IV, section
II): “Colleagues in office, partners in trade, call one another brothers; and frequently feel towards one
another as if they really were so. Their good agreement is an advantage to all.” In a similar vein Alfred
Marshall (1961 [1890]) related labor market rigidity to the reluctance of workers to migrate due to old
associations. More recently, economists have particularly paid attention to the impact of affective
relations within the family (e.g., Becker 1981). Interpersonal relations outside families have only
occasionally received attention.
3
                                                            
1 According to La Porta et al., worldwide the average ownership of the three largest shareholders in publicly
traded companies is 46 percent. They conclude that dispersed ownership of public companies is a myth.
2 Interview in the Dutch newspaper Volkskrant, 24-12-1998 (translated from Dutch).
3 For instance, in the context of job search (Boorman 1973), price formation (Okun 1981), the functioning of
organizations (Rotemberg 1994), and the private provision of public goods (van Dijk and van Winden 1997). See
also Dasgupta (1999) who surveys issues and literature related to the notion of social capital.3
For these reasons, we think it is appropriate and productive to pay more attention to social
dynamics in economics. This paper is intended to contribute to the development of this line of
research. Specifically, our goal is to investigate experimentally the development of (affective) social
ties structures - and thereby the formation of informal groups - through economic interaction in a
public good environment. By focusing on the dynamics of social ties, instead of the consequences of
the assumed existence thereof,  and group formation, this paper addresses in our view an important
lacuna in the existing literature. The use of laboratory experimentation as research method is helpful in
this respect, since a solid empirical study of the dynamics of interpersonal relations is difficult to
achieve in the field, due to observational and control problems. Our focus on how groups develop in a
public good environment, moreover, seems relevant for various (political) economic contexts. One can
think of crime prevention, environmental protection, voter turnout (political participation), and the
performance of organizations. For instance, organizational studies have well established that the social
structure of an organization clearly affects the willingness of its members to cooperate, coordinate,
share information, and to trust and support other members, which obviously influences its
performance (e.g., Scott 1981, Forsyth 1990). Finally, this study may also contribute to the recent
debate on extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation (e.g., Frey 1997, Kreps 1997), since social ties provide
a mechanism through which intrinsic motives enter as a determinant of behavior, along with the
extrinsic incentives provided by the environment itself.
To make this last point clearer we need to be more specific about the notion of a social tie.
Following a recent survey on interpersonal attachments (Baumeister and Leary 1995), the affective
component - sentiments - can be considered as the key element. Sentiments that individuals have with
respect to specific others are closely related to the extent they care about the well-being of those
others, which suggests a formalization in terms of utility interdependence (Coleman 1984). However,
it is important to note that a social tie is not simply determined by the weight that an individual
attaches to the well-being or utility of another subject.
4 This would only be the case if individuals are
neutral towards people they do not know. If positive or negative sentiments are maintained towards
others in general, a social tie with a specific individual can only be said to exist if the weight attached
to this specific other’s well-being differs from the weight given to the well-being of others in general
(a generalized other).
5 Therefore, to establish the existence of a social tie, two interpersonal
                                                            
4 In the sociological literature a social tie is usually seen as a mutual, two-sided relationship. A tie between
between individuals i and j would then consist of i’s sentiments about j and j’s sentiments about i. However, for
ease of exposition and because sentiments are often not symmetric (see Wellman 1988), we will speak of i’s
social tie with j without immediate reference to j’s sentiments about i, and vice versa.
5 Of interest in this respect are the results of public good experiments. Among experimentalists there is a
growing consensus that different types of individuals exist (see Ledyard 1995). There are some who (almost)
never contribute to the public good, when it is a dominant strategy for rational selfish individuals not to do so,
whereas others (almost) always contribute. This may well be related to differences in attitudes towards others in
general.4
orientations need to be measured: the orientation of an individual towards the interests of an unknown,
generalized other, and the orientation towards the interests of a specific individual. In the experiment
this will be done with the help of a new measuring device, called the ‘circle-test’ (see section 2). The
next question is how social ties - providing an intrinsic motivation to advance (if positive) or harm (if
negative) the interests of the specific others involved - develop. It is generally acknowledged that ties
develop through prolonged interaction, and erode when the interaction ends (Feld 1981, Granovetter
1985, Coleman 1990, Levine and Moreland 1998). These authors further suggest that ties are largely
the unconscious by-product of social interaction (see also Granovetter 1992). Field studies seem to
confirm this (e.g., Aldrich 1995). Dependent on whether the interaction is valued positively or
negatively, positive or negative sentiments are formed (Homans 1950, 1961, Feld 1981, Fararo 1989).
It may be expected therefore that (rudimentary) social ties will develop during a repeated public good
game, as studied in this paper, and that these ties will depend on the payoff of the interaction.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 goes into the design and procedures of
the experiment. Results are presented in section 3, while section 4 concludes.5
2. Design and procedures of the experiment
In 4 sessions a total number of 56 subjects participated, of which 35 were students of economics. On
average 51 Dutch guilders (approximately US$ 25) were earned by the subjects in about 1.5 hours. The
experiment was completely computerized, and took place in the CREED-laboratory of the University of
Amsterdam. Table 1 gives an overview of the sequence of events. In short, each session started with an
application of the ‘circle-test’ (see below), followed by 32 periods of a repeated 4-person public good
game. After 25 periods this game was - without prior announcement - interrupted for a second
application of the circle-test, after which the game continued for the remaining seven rounds. Details
concerning the circle-tests, the public good game, and the experimental procedures are discussed next.
Circle-test
To measure social ties we will use an instrument inspired by the so-called ‘ring-test of social value
orientation’ (Liebrand 1984). The ring-test asks subjects to make a series of 24 choices between own-
other payoff combinations. Each own-other payoff combination allocates a positive or negative amount
of money to the decision maker her/himself and to the subject with whom the individual is anonymously
matched. The pairs of allocations lie on a circle with the origin as center (which explains the name of the
test). The horizontal axis measures the amount of money allocated to the person her- or himself (S), and
the vertical axis the amount of money allocated to the other (O). Each allocation can be considered as a
vector. If for each subject the preferred allocations are added, the angle of the resulting vector with the
horizontal axis is a measure of the extent the individual cares about the other. The ring-test has proven to
be an useful tool for measuring attitudes towards an unknown,  generalized other (called social value
orientation by psychologists). The predictive validity of the test, inside as well as outside the
laboratory, has been shown by many studies (see, e.g., Rusbult and van Lange 1996). For an
application in an economic experiment see Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram (1996).
For measuring attitudes towards several specific others the ringtest in its original form is not
practical. Repeated measurements would result in too many questions and would cost too much time.
We therefore developed the circle-test. In the circle-test the attitude of a subject towards someone else
is measured by only one decision. Subjects are requested to select a point on a circle that is presented
to them on the computer screen, where each point on the circle represents an allocation of money to
the person her/himself (S) and another person (O). The amounts allocated can be positive or negative,
with S2 + O2 = (1000)2 , and are expressed in points (where 200 points are equal to 1 Dutch guilder,
approximately 0.5 US dollar). Figure 1 shows the computer screen of the circle-test. Subjects receive
computerized instructions. They have to practice using the mouse or keyboard to select an allocation
of money, and they have to answer some questions correctly before proceeding (to check
understanding). The circle-test starts with the computer program displaying a circle without an arrow.
When the subject clicks somewhere on the circle, an arrow is displayed and in the right upper part of6
the screen the amounts for Self and Other are shown. The subject can move the arrow by clicking on
the circle or using the keyboard. Every time the amounts in the right upper part of the screen are
updated. The final decision has to be confirmed.
Table 1. Sequence of events.
Circle-test. Subjects allocate a
positive or negative amount of money
to themselves (S, horizontal axis) and
an anonymous other (O, vertical axis).
Payoffs are disclosed after the
experiment.
Four-person public good game.
Subjects observe each period the
decisions of the other group members:
A, B and C.
32 periods are announced, after 25
periods the game is interrupted.
              A            B          C
Circle-tests. Subjects allocate positive
or negative amounts of money to
themselves and to their group
members A, B and C. Payoffs are
disclosed after the experiment.
Restart public good game. Periods
26-32 are played.
Subjects fill in a short questionnaire.
Results of the circle-tests are revealed.
Subjects are paid privately.7
Self






Figure 1. The computer screen of the circle-test. The position of the arrow can be changed by clicking
with the mouse on the circle or using the keyboard. The numbers (points) shown are automatically
updated. In the three circle-tests after the 25 periods of the public good game, a scrollable table with
results of the public good game is displayed in the lower part of the screen.
The experiment starts with a circle-test to measure the attitude towards an anonymous (generalized)
Other. The public good game played subsequently is (unexpectedly) interrupted after the 25th period and
three more circle-tests are carried out. In each of these tests the Other is one of the group members in the
public good game, labeled A, B or C. During the tests the subjects can still see the results of the public
good game: the decisions of the A, B and C member, and their own decisions in the game. In this way,
the circle-tests can measure whether the attitude of a subject towards a group member is influenced by
the behavior of this group member in the public good game. For example, one would expect a more
positive (less negative) angle towards a member who contributed more in the game.
Public good experiment
Subjects were randomly assigned to a four-person group. The composition of the groups stayed constant
for all 32 periods. The other three group members were identified as A, B and C. In each period a subject
had to distribute an endowment of 10 markers over two activities X and Y. Activity X generated earnings
exclusively for the subject her/himself (private account), whereas activity Y generated earnings for all
group members (public account). For each subject the endowment of markers was the same in all
periods. Every marker in the public account earned 7 points for all group members, while the value of i
markers in the private account was: 21*i-i
2. Fixed costs of 60 points were subtracted each period.
The first period started after everybody had finished the computerized instructions. Each period
subjects had to type in how many markers they wanted to spend on activities X and Y. After each period
they received feedback about the number of markers spent by each other group member (A, B, and C) on
activity Y and their own earnings. In the lower part of the screen the decisions and results of previous
periods were displayed. Subjects could access information about all previous periods by using the page-
up and page-down keys.8
Under the usual (benchmark) assumption of rational own-payoff maximization, the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is characterized by dominant strategies. The dominant strategy is
to put in each period game 3 markers in the public account and 7 markers in the private account. The
Pareto-optimal outcome, on the other hand, entails that subjects put all markers into the public account.
Players earn 122 points in the Nash equilibrium and 220 points in the Pareto-optimal outcome, where
each point is equal to 0.5 Dutch cents.
Procedures
Subjects were recruited by announcements on  bulletin boards in university buildings and an
advertisement in the university newspaper. After all subjects were seated, computerized instructions for
the first part (the circle-test) were started. The instructions contained some questions to check
understanding. After the instructions all subjects took the decision required by the test. Subjects did not
receive any feedback about the results of this test (nor about the results of the later circle-tests) until the
whole experiment was finished. Information about the public good game was only given after the end of
the first circle-test. A translation of the instructions is provided in the Appendix.
The payoff structure of the public good game was explained with a table on the computer screen
and on a handout, and subjects had to calculate some outcomes to check understanding. The table was
also projected on the wall to show subjects that everybody had the same table. The number of periods
(32) was also public knowledge. Subjects did not know, however, that the public good experiment would
be interrupted after period 25.
After 25 periods the public good experiment was interrupted and the instructions for the second
circle-test were started (see Apendix). In this case, subjects had to perform the test three times, where the
Other in these tests concerned the subjects A, B and C, respectively (their fellow group members in the
public good experiment). The results of all 25 periods of the public good experiment remained accessible
to them on the lower part of the screen. Subjects could scroll to see their own decisions as well as the
decisions of the A, B and C subject.
The public good experiment was restarted after everybody had finished the three circle-tests, and periods
26-32 were played. After the experiment, subjects filled in a short questionnaire and were subsequently
paid, one at a time, in another room.9
3. Results
In this section we first present some general results concerning the measurement of social ties (the circle-
tests) and the public good experiment. This is followed by a discussion of the formation and impact of
social ties. Finally, we go into the typology of the observed social ties and the issue of group formation.
3.1 Measurement of social ties and contributions to the public good
Measurement of social ties
The outcomes of the first (‘pre’) circle-test and the three second (‘post’) circle-tests can be summarized
as follows. The mean of the angles in the post-tests (11.2￿) differs hardly from the mean angle in the pre-
test (13.4￿). A small negative drift of -2￿ is observed. This disguises, however, the changes that took
place at the individual level. The mean of the absolute differences between the pre- and post-tests is 13￿.
This goes together with an increase of the standard deviations (from 15.7 to 19.3). Of the 55 subjects
6, 14
chose an angle of approximately 0￿ (-5￿ £ angle £ 5￿) in both the pre- and the post-tests, while 13 chose
approximately 0￿ in the pre-test and a positive or negative angle in at least one of the post-tests. Only 3
subjects chose 0￿ in the post-tests only. Thus, the number of subjects that consistently or only later on
displayed purely selfish behavior is relatively small. Not surprisingly, 98% of the angles fell within the
interval [-45￿,45￿], which implies that the absolute weight attached to the Other’s payoff is almost never
larger than 1. The increase in the standard deviation of the pre- and post-tests angles could be caused by
subjects differentiating between their group members. It may also be caused by groups going through
different experiences. We will see that both factors play a role.
Table 2. Positive, neutral and negative attitudes of subjects towards others.
positive neutral negative total
social value orientation (pre-test) 26 (47%) 28 (51%) 1  (2%) 55
sentiments towards specific subjects (post-tests) 80 (48%) 73 (44%) 12  (8%) 165
social ties (difference of post- and pre-tests) 41 (25%) 76 (46%) 48 (29%) 165
Note: neutral attitudes are defined as attitudes between -5￿ and +5￿.
Results can also be expressed in percentages of positive, neutral or negatives attitudes. Table 2
illustrates. Negative social value orientations (pre-test angles) hardly occur. Negative sentiments towards
                                                            
6 Of the 56 subjects, one person did not understand the instructions of the test. The subject expressed this confusion
in the debriefing questionnaire. This led to erratic choices, as the subject changed her or his interpretation of the test
during the post-tests. The data for this person are deleted.10
specific subjects (post-tests angles) occur more often, while negative social ties occur as much as
positive ties. In 46% of the cases no ties were formed. It is noted that the subjects who choose an angle
of 0
￿ in the pre-test and all post-tests already cause 27% of all social ties to be neutral.
To check the validity of the social ties measurement, we included in the debriefing questionnaire
the sociometric question whether they would want to continue with their current partners (asked for A, B
and C, separately) or preferred to be matched with another subject, in case the public good experiment
were repeated. One would expect that the more positive the tie with a person the stronger the inclination
to continue with this person. The results are supportive. The correlation coefficients concerning the
willingness to continue, on the one hand, and sentiments and social ties, on the other hand, are .46 and



















Figure 2. Average individual contributions to the public good per period.
Public good game
Figure 2 shows the mean contributions to the public good by period. On average, subjects contribute
persistently and substantially more than the Nash equilibrium for own-payoff maximizers would imply,
except for the last period. Towards the end the for this type of game usual decline occurs (see, e.g.,
Ledyard 1995). The interruption after period 25 shows no effect on contributions: the contributions in
period 25 do not differ significantly from those in period 26 (two-tailed Wilcoxon test, at the group level:
p=.7598).
Between groups large differences exist. In the next subsection we will investigate to what extent
social value orientations and social ties can shed a light on the observed development of contributions.11
3.2 Formation and impact of social ties
Formation of social ties
Our hypothesis is that social ties arise as a result of the interaction in the public good game. First, we
address the question whether subjects who contributed more to the public good are more appreciated by
their group members than subjects who contributed less. For each subject we calculate the average
sentiment of the three partners towards this subject (the average angle of the post-tests). This sentiment
correlates highly with the contributions of the subject in the public good game: R=0.51 if period 1 to 25
are considered, and 0.42 if only periods 1 to 5 are taken into account. The average social tie towards a
subject also correlates highly with the contributions of that subject; R=0.49 if periods 1 to 25 are
considered, and R=0.56 for periods 1 to 5. All these correlations are statistically highly significant
(p<0.01).
Of course, one would expect that the attitude of a subject towards a specific other does not only
depend on the characteristics of this specific other (that is, her or his contributions in the public good
game) but also on the social value orientation of the subject. This is indeed what we find. Table 3 shows
a linear regression with the post-test angle as dependent variable and the social value orientation of the
subject and the contributions of the specific other as independent variables. Both variables appear to have
a large impact. The results are roughly the same if only the contributions in periods 1 to 5 are considered
(not in table).
Table 3: Linear regression with the angle measured by the post-test as a dependent variable and, as
independent variables, the angle measured by the pre-test and the contributions of the other subject in
periods 1-25.
B SE B Beta t Sign. t
Social Value Orientation .366 .086 .298 4.279 .0000
Contributions of the other in periods 1-25 .126 .025 .355 5.099 .0000
Constant -15.118 4.536 -3.333 .0011
Multiple R: 0.465
Adjusted R Square: 0.207
A priori one cannot exclude the possibility that subjects develop a general attitude towards their group,
reflecting how well the group did in the public good game, and base their decisions in the post-tests only
upon this. Alternatively, subjects may actively discriminate between their group members and have a
more positive attitude towards those group members who contributed more in the public good game. The
correlation results reported above, however, suggest that the latter motivation is at work. To test this
more directly we will now look at intra-person comparisons. As discussed in section 2, we developed the
circle-test specifically for this purpose. As a test we compute across all subjects the correlation between,
on the one hand, the difference in the post-test angles regarding alternative pairs of group members and,
on the other hand, the difference in the contributions of these group members. It turns out that the12
correlation is 0.57 if all 25 periods before the post-tests are taken, and 0.55 if only periods 1 to 5 are
considered (both significant at the .001 level). These correlations show that during the public good game
the subjects have built specific bonds with specific group members, rather than a general ‘group
cohesion’. We will come back to this in section 3.3.
Impact of social ties
An interesting question is whether the attitudes of the subjects towards each other influence their
behavior in the public good game. First we test whether the social value orientation, as measured in the
pre-test, affects behavior in the first periods of the public good game. This does not appear to be the case,
since no correlation is found between the pre-test angles and the contributions in the first period or the
first five periods. Many of the subjects with a pre-test angle of 0￿ nevertheless contribute (substantially)
more than the ‘Nash equilibrium’ strategy would imply in that case (3 per period). A possible
explanation is the presence of some form of ‘conditional cooperation’ (Keser and van Winden 1999; see
also Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman 1999).
To examine whether the post-test angles are consistent with behavior in the public good game
after its resumption in period 26, we average the three angles of the post-tests per subject and correlate
the resulting measure with the subject’s contributions in the periods 26-32. The mean post-angle per
subject correlates highly (R=0.59, p<0.001) with the sum of the contributions in period 26 to 32. As is to
be expected, the correlation with behavior (contributions) in the first 25 periods is much weaker
(R=0.29).
3.3 Typology of social ties and group formation
So far, we have focussed on one-sided sentiments and one-sided social ties, neglecting whether these  are
also mutual. In this section mutual sentiments and ties are examined. Furthermore, we will look at group
structure, that is, the formation of (informal) groups through social ties. A first question that arises is
whether a tendency exist towards symmetric mutual sentiments and ties. Table 4 shows the results.13




type sign percentage of pairs percentage of pairs
symmetric
+ + 29 10
- - 0 5
asymmetric
+ 0 37 22
+ - 4 10
0 - 8 34
mutually
neutral
0 0 22 19
sum 100 100
Note: neutral attitudes (0) are defined by angles between -5￿ and +5￿.
Sentiments are neutral and ties are absent in approximately 20% of the cases. Mutually positive
sentiments occur in approximately 29% of all pairs. As mutually negative sentiments are absent,
symmetry of (non-neutral) sentiments also occurs in 29% of the cases. Social ties show a different
outcome. Mutually positive ties occur only in 10% of the cases, and (non-neutral) symmetric ties in
general occur in 15% of the cases. Asymmetry is much more common (66%). It is concluded that, in our
public good environment, interaction among individuals with equal endowments and payoff structures
does not lead to pervasive positive ties among them. Apparently, individual differences in social value
orientation and reaction patterns that cannot be controlled for, result in complex dynamics. The
suggestion borne out by the ‘minimal group paradigm’ literature and social identity theory (see Tajfel
and Turner 1986, Taylor and Moghaddam 1994) that bonds form easily and lead to behavior favoring
formal group members, needs to be qualified. Our results indicate that once interaction is allowed group
cohesion can no longer be taken for granted.
On the basis of our experimental results, social ties structures (social networks) are likely to
differ widely among groups, depending on the success of the interaction. To examine this, we compare
the two worst performing groups in terms of mean contributions to the public good with the two best
performing groups. Table 5 presents a comparison of the different types of ties in these groups. Whereas
most of the ties in the best performing groups are (mutually) positive, most of the ties in the worst
performing groups are either negative or neutral. Figure 6 shows the social ties structures in these groups.
The networks of the two worst groups are quite similar, as are the networks of the successful groups.
Among them the two types of networks differ considerably. Note, however, that also in the groups with
successful interaction (groups 2 and 12), networks are far from complete and asymmetry of ties occurs.14
Table 5. Comparison of social ties in the two worst and the two best performing groups.
two worst groups two best groups
group 5 group 7 group 2 group 12
mean contr.
per period
3.76 4.40 9.94 9.80
sent. ties sent. ties sent. ties sent. ties
sign cases cases cases cases cases cases cases cases
+ + 2 2 2 1
- -
+ 0 3 1 1 3 3 4 3
+ - 1
0 - 2 3
0 0 3 4 5 2 1 1 1
sum 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
4 3
2 1





Group 7 4 3
2 1
Group 12
            negative tie                  neutral tie  positive tie
Figure 3 . Social Networks in the two worst groups (5 and 7) and the two best groups (2 and 12).15
4. Conclusion
This experimental study of informal group formation, through the development of social ties structures,
shows two main results. First, prolonged functional interaction in a public good game leads to the
development of social ties, the valence of which depends on the success of the interaction in terms of
contributions to the public good.
7 Since a social tie refers to the difference between the weight that an
individual attaches to the well-being of a specific other and the weight given to the well-being of a
generalized (randomly selected) other, the success of the interaction is partly determined by the
individual’s social value orientation, which measures the latter weight. In this respect our results
corroborate earlier findings indicating that subjects already start out with very different distributional
preferences. However, these preferences appear to change due to affective responses to the beneficial or
harmful behavior of those interacted with. In the experiment this happened with 54% of the subjects.
Second, subjects discriminate between group members on the basis of their relatiive
contributions, that is, relative to the contributions of other group members. The resulting dynamics
appears to generate a variety of social ties between group members. Most (66%) of the ties turn out to be
asymmetric, notwithstanding the shared interest in the public good, the equal endowments and the
identical payoff structures. This study suggests that individual differences in social value orientation and
(affective) reaction patterns that are not controlled for are responsible for this. Focusing on the best and
worst performing groups in terms of contributions to the public good, we find that the nature of the social
ties structures (networks) differs considerably between groups. Whereas most of the ties among members
of the best performing groups are (mutually) positive, most of the ties in the worst performing groups are
either negative or neutral. However, also in the successful groups networks are far from complete and
asymmetry occurs.
Social dynamics  turn out to be complicated. Even when individuals share objectives, and
preferences and endowments are identical, very different outcomes are possible, depending on social
value orientations and individual reaction patterns. Thus, even under favorable circumstances, pervasive
positive social ties cannot be expected. Affective responses, based on sentiments and emotions,  are not a
panacea for the failures of rational selfishness, as is sometimes suggested (Hirshleifer 1987). This has
important implications. For example, our findings produce new insights on why local communities or
neighborhoods sometimes succeed in the private provision of public goods, whereas on other occasions
they do not. These findings provide a rationale for (selective) government intervention which duely takes
account of the dynamics of the social ties structure within the community. In this context, interesting
issues for future research concern the impact of government policies with respect to housing, education
(schools) and mobility, for instance. Similarly, in work situations, managers cannot take it for granted
that social interaction will go well among equals, and that work performance will be high. Our findings
                                                            
7 This result corroborates the finding of van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden (1997) for a  two-person instead
of four-person public good game.16
show that subjects can set into motion a destructive social dynamic, by underperforming. In both settings
of work and community, the results suggest the importance of leadership in controlling and channeling
emotions and sentiments to build effective teams and communities. This supports a rather different
perspective on management and hierarchy than the one provided by standard agency theory. While
providing monetary incentives and monitoring behavior remain important, the role of managers appears
to go much further than that.
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Appendix
SUMMARY OF THE INSTRUCTIONS
The instructions of all three parts of the experiment are fully computerized. To safe space we provide only a
summary of the three parts of the experiment.
Part 1
You are asked to make a single choice. The choice concerns the allocation of points to yourself and to a
randomly chosen other subject (‘the other’); 200 points equal 1 guilder. Your options are depicted on the next
screen. Each point on the circle gives a combination of points you receive or loose and points the other receives
or looses. Choose now a point on the circle with the mouse. When you click, the corresponding points for you
and the other are revealed. By clicking on other points of the circle, other combinations you may choose become
visible. You are now asked to answer two questions to check your understanding <...not reproduced here...>.
The other subject with whom you will be linked has to take a similar decision. Your reward is
determined by your own choice and the choice of the other. During the experiment you will not receive any
information about the choice made by the other. When you get paid out, once the whole experiment has finished,
you will informed about the choice of the other.
To check your understanding of the procedure, we will ask you two further questions <...not reproduced
here...>. The exercises are finished. You are now asked to choose a combination of points for yourself and of
points for the other.
Part 2
Introduction
Part 2 consists of 32 periods. In each period you are asked to take a decision. Each decision concerns the
distribution of  10 markers over two activities: activity X and activity Y.
Activity X leads to a payoff for yourself only. Activity Y leads to a payoff for yourself and also for
three other subjects. Each of the three other subjects has to take similar decisions: activity X leads to a payoff for
her/himself only. Activity Y leads to a payoff not only for this participant, but also for you and the other two
participants. After each period you are informed about the decisions of the three others. You will be paid after
the end of the experiment.
To avoid any misunderstandings: the subject you were paired with in the first part of the experiment is
not among the three subject you will now be linked with. Part 1 and Part 2 are completely independent of each
other.
The three subjects with whom you will interact are called A, B and C. During all 32 periods A, B and C
remain the same subjects.
Payoff information
On the next screen the upper-left corner shows you a summary of how your payoffs from the activities
X and Y are determined. This summary remains visible during the experiment.
Your payoff from activity X depends on the number of markers you yourself spend on this activity. The
column ‘value’ shows the payoff of each marker that you spend on activity X. As you see, each extra marker
pays you less. The column ‘sum’ shows you the total payoff for each number of markers that you spend on X.
Your payoff from activity Y depends on the total number of markers that you and the other three
participants spend on this activity. Each marker pays you and each of the three others 7 points.
In each period fixed costs will be subtracted from your payoffs, namely 60 points. Thus, your total
earnings per period will be: the payoff from activity X PLUS the payoff from activity Y MINUS the fixed costs.
On your handout ‘Overview of earnings and costs per period’ you find the same information as you can
see now in the upper-left corner of your screen. On the other handout ‘Table of total earnings’ the earnings for
all possible combinations of markers allocated to activity X and Y are listed.
Making a decision
We will now practice how decisions are taken. On the next screen you are instructed how to type in
your decision. First you type in how many of your 10 markers you want to spend on activity X. Then, the
number of markers for activity Y. You will subsequently be asked to confirm your decision. After confirmation
you cannot change your decision anymore.
Registration table
At the bottom of the screen, you see now the REGISTRATION TABLE. In this table your decisions, the
decisions of the three others and the earnings are recorded. This table will always be visible.19
Questions and excercises
To check your understanding of the experiment you are now requested to answer some questions and to do a
number of exercises. <......>
You are ready now with the exercises. Period 1 will start, once all participants are ready.
Periods 1-25
After period 25
We interrupt part 2 of the experiment and start with the third part. After part 3 has finished, we will continue
with part 2.
Part 3
You will be asked the same question as in part 1, namely to choose between several combinations of points for
yourself and for another. However, this other is not randomly chosen as was the case in part 1, but is one of the
participants with whom you are linked in part 2. You will be asked to take three decisions. In these three
decisions the other is, subsequently, participant A, B and C of part 2 of the experiment. The others will take
similar decisions. Your earnings are again determined by your own decisions and the decisions by the other three
participants. Also during this part of the experiment you will not receive information about the decisions of the
others. Only after the experiment you will be informed about your earnings.
To refresh your memory, we ask you to do an exercise. You are ready with the exercise. You are now
asked to take the three decisions. <......>
Part 3 of the experiment has finished. As soon as everybody is ready, we will continue with part 2.
Continuation of part 2: periods 26-32.20
OVERVIEW OF EARNINGS AND COSTS PER PERIOD
EARNINGS MARKERS IN X EARNINGS MARKERS IN Y
MARKER VALUE SUM MARKER VALUE SUM
OF MARKER OFMARKER
 1 20  20  1 7   7
 2 18  38  2 7  14
 3 16  54  3 7  21
 4 14  68  4 7  28
 5 12  80  5 7  35
 6 10  90  6 7  42
 7  8  98  7 7  49
 8  6 104  8 7  56
 9  4 108  9 7  63
10  2 110 10 7  70
11 7  77
12 7  84
13 7  91



























COSTS PER PERIOD: 6021
Table of total earnings
                            Own markers
 X  10   9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1   0
 Y   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10
 0  50  55  58  59  58  55  50  43  34  23  10
 1  57  62  65  66  65  62  57  50  41  30  17
 2  64  69  72  73  72  69  64  57  48  37  24
 3  71  76  79  80  79  76  71  64  55  44  31
 4  78  83  86  87  86  83  78  71  62  51  38
m  5  85  90  93  94  93  90  85  78  69  58  45
a  6  92  97 100 101 100  97  92  85  76  65  52
r  7  99 104 107 108 107 104  99  92  83  72  59
k  8 106 111 114 115 114 111 106  99  90  79  66
e  9 113 118 121 122 121 118 113 106  97  86  73
r 10 120 125 128 129 128 125 120 113 104  93  80
s 11 127 132 135 136 135 132 127 120 111 100  87
12 134 139 142 143 142 139 134 127 118 107  94
o 13 141 146 149 150 149 146 141 134 125 114 101
f 14 148 153 156 157 156 153 148 141 132 121 108
15 155 160 163 164 163 160 155 148 139 128 115
o 16 162 167 170 171 170 167 162 155 146 135 122
t 17 169 174 177 178 177 174 169 162 153 142 129
h 18 176 181 184 185 184 181 176 169 160 149 136
e 19 183 188 191 192 191 188 183 176 167 156 143
r 20 190 195 198 199 198 195 190 183 174 163 150
s 21 197 202 205 206 205 202 197 190 181 170 157
22 204 209 212 213 212 209 204 197 188 177 164
23 211 216 219 220 219 216 211 204 195 184 171
24 218 223 226 227 226 223 218 211 202 191 178
25 225 230 233 234 233 230 225 218 209 198 185
26 232 237 240 241 240 237 232 225 216 205 192
27 239 244 247 248 247 244 239 232 223 212 199
28 246 251 254 255 254 251 246 239 230 219 206
29 253 258 261 262 261 258 253 246 237 226 213
30 260 265 268 269 268 265 260 253 244 233 220